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Abstract  
Oil indexation and hub-based pricing are two competing pricing mechanisms in the 
international natural gas markets. The debates over whether hub-based pricing is 
preferable to oil indexation have become intense among academics and practitioners, 
for example, whether and when East Asia should adopt hub pricing. This paper 
contributes empirically to the debate using a multiple bubble test. Adopting the 
generalized sup augmented Dickey-Fuller test proposed by Phillips et al. (2015), we 
show that more explosive bubbles exist in Japan and European gas prices than in the 
US prices. The argument is that hub-based pricing mechanism can better reflect 
fundamental values in the gas markets and thus is less subject to speculations. Given 
the recent trend of financialization in energy markets, gas prices are more likely to 
deviate from fundamental values when they are not clear to investors. Although oil 
indexation is simple and has been an effective tool over the past few decades, our 
results suggest that hub pricing is associated with less extreme price movements in the 
market and thus is a better choice for both policy makers and practitioners.  
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Is hub-based pricing a better choice than oil indexation for natural gas? 
Evidence from a multiple bubble test 
1 Introduction 
A heated debate has emerged recently in the literature over the pricing of natural gas. 
Two competing pricing mechanisms, namely, oil indexation and gas-on-gas 
competition (GOG, spot, or hub-based) pricing mechanisms, coexist in the 
international natural gas markets. The US Henry hub gas price, for example, is the 
main representative of a GOG pricing system, whereas oil indexation has a dominant 
role in the East Asian natural gas markets (IGU, 2017). Europe has been in the 
process of shifting from oil indexation to the US pricing model (Grandi, 2014; Shi, 
2016). East Asia is in the process of creating its own benchmark gas prices to use as 
the foundation of hub pricing. China, Japan, and Singapore have opened gas 
exchanges, and Singapore created some liquefied natural gas (LNG) price indexes, 
with the development of futures markets (Shi and Variam, 2016, 2017).  
Although oil indexation is well established and has helped gas gain market share over 
the past few decades, it is under intensive debates recently (Stern, 2014; Komlev, 
2016). Oil indexation was initially proposed by the Netherlands in the 1960s in the 
policy paper known as the Nota de Pous. The price of natural gas is based on the 
“netback value” of alternative fuels, such as gasoline and heavy fuel oil. The formula 
takes the value at the point of sale and then backward by deducting the cost of 
transportation and profit. This price mechanisms guaranteed that gas would be more 
competitive than petroleum products and thus gain market share for it (IEA, 2013).  
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The arguments in favor of a GOG pricing mechanism are based on the fact that 
natural gas and crude oil are not perfect substitutes and have different fundamental 
driving factors (Zhang et al., 2018a). If the true fundamental value is not known, 
prices tend to deviate from it, which results in abnormal price dynamics. 1 
International energy markets have experienced an increasing trend of financialization 
since the 2008 global financial crisis (Zhang, 2017), which means that the price of 
energy commodities, such as oil and gas, are more likely to behave like financial 
assets. In this sense, noise trading, speculation, and asset bubbles are more likely to 
appear in international energy markets. Su et al. (2017), for example, find that oil 
prices are shown to have multiple explosive bubbles. The substantial gaps in prices 
between North America, Europe, and Asia were also used as reasons to criticize oil 
indexation pricing mechanisms (Shi and Variam, 2016), and empirically it has been 
demonstrated that such gaps are due to different pricing mechanisms more than 
market fundamentals (Zhang et al., 2018a).  
Despite an increasing volume of voice calling for hub-based pricing system (e.g., (Shi 
and Variam, 2016, 2017; Stern, 2014)), oil indexation is still considered “the best 
remedy for market failure” (Komlev, 2016) and has been support by many producers. 
The rationale for oil indexation over hub pricing (e.g., Komlev, 2016) comprises the 
following three main points: price hubs can represent only a limited share of total 
demand and supply in the market, or “residual market segment,” because of the 
prevailing oil indexation contracts; index prices can act as price anchors for hub 
                                                        
1 Fundamental value and price anomalies are discussed in the behaviorial finance literature, for 
example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997).  
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prices; and market failure is more likely to happen with GOG competition pricing. 
There is also an argument that, compared to the gas market, the oil market is larger 
and contains more market players, and thus it is less likely to be manipulated.  
A key issue in this debate is which pricing mechanism is better for the natural gas 
markets. Which one is the best remedy for market failure: oil indexation or hub 
pricing? While the term “market failure” is an economic concept used by Komlev 
(2016) describing the situation that suboptimal prices lead to consistent imbalances in 
natural gas market, it happens when prices fail to respond demand and supply side 
shocks. The key point of our argument is that oil indexation cannot properly reflect 
market fundamentals in natural gas market (Stern, 2014), which is one of the main 
causes of the “Asian Premium” (Zhang et al., 2018a). How this issue is addressed has 
strong policy implications and crucial practical relevance because both try to avoid 
extreme price movements or persistent imbalance of demand and supply. Technically, 
these arguments can be transformed into a test of asset bubbles in natural gas markets. 
A better market mechanism should be more efficient and less likely to be subject to 
asset bubbles. 
Borrowing from the concept in financial economics, a better market should be 
efficient—in other words, prices should be able to reflect the fundamental values of 
an underlying asset and respond to information quickly. Without clear information on 
the fundamental value, the price of an asset can deviate significantly, which can result 
in pricing bubbles. If the market is inefficient and investor trading behavior can 
influence asset prices, then speculation is also possible. Noise traders’ risk (De Long 
5 
 
et al., 1990a) and speculative trading (De Long et al., 1990b) in financial markets can 
trigger excess price movements or asset bubbles, which are costly and can generate 
significant welfare losses.  
Natural gas markets are geographically segmented into three major regions, namely, 
the North American market, the European market, and the East Asian market (IEA, 
2013). Each market has distinctive characteristics: a purely hub-based pricing system 
(the US), a mixture of hub pricing and oil indexation (Europe), and a regime 
predominantly based on oil indexation (East Asia or the Japanese market in particular). 
This clear division across natural gas markets enables us to empirically comment on 
the effectiveness of the competing pricing mechanisms based on historical data. A 
simple hypothesis based on this argument is as follows: A hub-based pricing system, 
by better reflecting market demand and supply factors and thus the fundamental 
values of natural gas, can provide a more efficient market system that is associated 
with fewer price bubbles. Alternatively, we would expect more explosive price 
movements to exist in the Japanese gas price than the European price, whereas the US 
price should have the fewest.  
This paper contributes to the recent debates on international natural gas pricing 
mechanisms (e.g. Stern, 2014; Komlev, 2016). While Stern (2014) is a strong 
supporter for the hub-based pricing system, Komlev (2016) clearly stands on the 
opposite side and gives credit to the oil indexation system. Both authors focusing on 
the practical facts and rationales but without clear statistical evidence. Adopting the 
generalized sup ADF test proposed by Phillips et al. (2015), we can comment on the 
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question of which pricing mechanism can better reflect fundamentals in the 
international natural gas markets and less subject to speculations. Thus, our paper has 
clear value that contributes to these debates. Moreover, in terms of real practice, the 
East Asia and Central and East Europe have remained the major battlegrounds 
between oil indexation and hub pricing (EIA, 2017), which also gives us practical 
motivation.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 briefly introduces the methodology of testing multiple bubbles, 
namely, the generalized sup augmented Dickey-Fuller (GSADF) test proposed by 
Phillips et al. (2015). Data used in our empirical study are summarized in section 4, 
and empirical results are reported in section 5. The last section concludes with a 
policy discussion.  
2 Literature review 
2.1 Decoupling of oil and gas prices  
A large volume of literature has recently emerged to investigate pricing mechanisms 
for natural gas. Many of them start with empirical tests on of whether gas and oil 
prices have been decoupled (e.g., Brown and Yücel, 2008; Erdos, 2012; Hartley et al., 
2008; Ramberg et al., 2017; Serletis and Shahmoradi, 2005). The motivation for these 
studies is the observed price turmoil in oil and gas markets and the apparent 
divergence in the price of these two commodities. This phenomenon became clearer 
after the US shale gas revolution and was further amplified by the 2008 global 
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financial crisis (Zhang et al., 2018a).  
The methodology typically used in testing the relationship between oil and gas is the 
cointegration approach (Brown and Yücel, 2008), which reflects the long-term 
relationship between oil and natural gas prices. In other words, given the oil 
indexation hypothesis, one would expect natural gas prices to be bound with oil prices 
in the long-run. There might be a temporary deviation in the long-run relationship, but 
an error correction mechanism exists to restore equilibrium. The empirical results, 
however, have yet to reach a consensus. For example, Brown and Yücel (2008) find 
that the weekly oil and gas prices in the US are cointegrated with a stable long-run 
relationship. Hartley et al. (2008) also confirm the error correction mechanism in the 
US market with longer monthly time-series data. They suggest that the link between 
gas and oil prices is indirect and show that short-term deviation is mainly due to 
fundamental demand/supply factors, such as inventory and weather. Asche et al. (2006) 
support a single-market hypothesis in the UK primary energy market, with a 
cointegrated relationship among oil, gas, and electricity prices. Regnard and Zakoian 
(2011) also confirm that oil prices can be used to predict natural gas prices, and they 
find a cointegration relationship between the one-month Brent price and the natural 
gas price in the Zeebrugge (Belgium) market over the period 2000-2005.  
The positive evidence of a long-term link between oil and gas prices is found mainly 
before the 2008 global financial crisis and thus generally predates the majority of the 
shale gas revolution, which, according to a series of research papers (e.g., Caporin and 
Fontini, 2017; Geng et al., 2016), proved to have strong impacts on the natural gas 
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market. Because of the new features in the international gas market, more recent 
studies have started to challenge the long-run relationship between oil and gas prices. 
For example, Ramberg and Parsons (2012) find structural breaks between oil and gas 
prices in the US market. Erdos (2012) suggests that the long-run oil-gas link in the US 
market is valid only until 2009. Zhang et al. (2017b) find that apart from the global 
financial crisis, the structural low oil prices linked to changing fundamentals is also a 
factor that leads to structural break in the oil-gas relationship. Empirical works by 
Brigida (2014) and Geng et al. (2016) suggest that the relative prices of natural gas 
and crude oil follow a state-dependent regime-switching model. Batten et al. (2017) 
focus on the dynamic linkage between these two commodities and suggest that the 
determinants of oil and gas prices are different. They also suggest that GOG in the US 
market and the shale gas revolution contribute to the decoupling of oil and gas.  
The US market has had a hub pricing system for decades, and thus the long-run 
boundedness of oil-gas prices loses its foundation. Hub pricing is supposed to be able 
to better reflect the fundamental value of natural gas (Shi and Variam, 2016; Stern, 
2014; Zhang et al., 2018a). In other words, the hub price of natural gas is determined 
by demand and supply in the natural gas market. On the contrary, given the explicit 
oil indexation, natural gas prices in the European and Japanese markets still depend 
heavily on the price of crude oil (Zhang et al., 2018a). Evidence on these two major 
natural gas markets, however, has started to show their potential decoupling. For 
example, Zhang and Ji (2018) uses a long-memory approach to investigate the 
dynamic links of natural gas prices in three markets with the Brent oil price and find 
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temporary decoupling in Europe and Japan. Shen et al., (2018) finds that extreme 
market risks can transmit to gas prices even in hub-based pricing system.  
2.2 From oil indexation to hub pricing 
Since the global financial crisis in 2008, international natural gas markets have 
changed dramatically. Although US prices remain historically low, prices in the other 
two major markets (i.e., Europe and Japan) have increased significantly. This further 
reinforces concerns by both policy makers and practitioners on the feasibility of 
moving from oil indexation to pricing hubs (e.g., Shi and Variam, 2017). European 
energy market regulators are more active in reforming European natural gas markets. 
Stern (Stern, 2014) describe the second half of the 2000s as “the perfect storm,” 
which included the elimination of destination clauses, the arrival of third-party access, 
and, most importantly, the emergence of pricing hubs. IGU (2015) finds that in 
2011/12, 45% of the gas trade in Europe took place through pricing hubs. Moreover, 
an increasing number of voices support establishing gas hubs in East Asia, for 
example, Shi and Variam (2016, 2017) and Zhang et al. (2018a).  
The main argument in IEA (2013), Stern (Stern, 2014), and Zhang et al. (2018a) is 
that oil and natural gas are not necessarily substitutes and have different underlying 
fundamentals. Their idea is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 
introduced by Fama (1965) and has become one of the foundational pillars of modern 
finance theory. The main argument is very simple: the price should reflect the 
fundamental value of the underlying asset, and in an efficient market it should 
respond to shocks accurately and quickly. Stern’s (Stern, 2014) two problems can be 
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considered an application of the EMH in the natural gas market. Pricing hubs enable 
gas prices to better reflect market fundamentals, and a properly functional pricing hub 
should have rapid price adjustment that responds to information.  
Komlev (2016), who represents mostly the interests of gas exporters, criticizes the 
recent European reforms and argues that oil indexation is still the best remedy for 
natural gas market failure. He suggests that oil and natural gas remain substitutes even 
in Europe, which justifies the initial rationale for oil indexation. Current global natural 
gas prices are the result of oil indexation. Oil indexation pricing remains the 
prevailing system in Asia, and even the price in a hub is closely linked with indexed 
prices. Although most of the recent research concurs on the decoupling of oil and gas 
prices in the US, Zhang and Ji (2018) find that the deviation of oil indexation in 
Europe and Japan could be temporary.   
The marketization and liberalization of the natural gas market toward a properly 
functional hub often take decades, and the process is costly. Policy makers in East 
Asia are particularly cautious and need to learn more about developments in Europe 
(Shi, 2016). The UK National Balancing Point (NBP), Netherland Title Transfer 
Facility (TTF), and German Net Connect Germany (NCG) hubs have played a vital 
role in the reform of European gas markets (Heather, 2012; Hulshof et al., 2016). 
Miriello and Polo ( 2015) review the development paths for natural gas hubs in 
Europe and find that although Germany and Italy consume large quantities of gas, 
only a small share is traded through their pricing hubs, and the majority of the gas 
consumed is bought through long-term contracts. In general, however, they find that 
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GOG reforms have proven to be effective.  
2.3 Financialization, bubbles, and regional natural gas prices 
A recent strand of the literature has advanced the concept of energy market 
financialization (e.g., Cheng and Xiong, 2014; Zhang, 2017; Zhang and Zhang, 2017). 
The concept does not simply link energy prices, such as oil prices, to financial 
markets (e.g., Broadstock et al., 2012); rather, it emphasizes that energy commodities 
have started to demonstrate the characteristics of a financial product. The crude oil 
market, for example, is considered an alternative investment by international investors 
(Sari et al., 2012). Nicolau and Palomba (2015) suggest that crude oil is still the most 
used instrument for hedging and speculation during a period of financial turmoil. As a 
consequence, models in financial markets can be used to understand the dynamics of 
energy prices (e.g., Zhang et al., 2018b; Zhang and Zhang, 2017; Zhang and Wu, 
2018).  
Kaufmann (2011), for example, suggests that the volatile oil price movement between 
2007 and 2008 is due to both market fundamentals and speculative trading in the 
market. Basher and Sadorsky (2016) use a battery of volatility models to investigate 
the hedging performance of oil against emerging market stock prices. Zhang (2017) 
studies the interactions between oil price shocks and major stock market returns. The 
evidence shows that the dynamics of oil prices reflect more movement in the global 
financial market, not vice versa. The 2008 global financial crisis has also been found 
to have profound impacts on global markets.  
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One of the problems with financialization is that speculative trading (e.g., Hache and 
Lantz, 2013) can exist and cause extreme price movements, or price bubbles. The 
extreme price movements in the international oil markets since the 2008 global 
financial crisis have triggered a series of studies to test and date the existence of 
abnormal price fluctuations. For example, Lammerding et al. (2013) find strong 
evidence of speculative bubbles in the recent oil price movements using a 
Markov-switching state space approach. Zhang and Yao (2016) explores dynamic 
bubbles of oil prices and predicts their crash time. Using state-space model and the 
log-periodic power law (LPPL) model, they find that bubble exists for oil prices 
between November 2001 and July 2008. The efficiencies of energy portfolios in 2008 
also appear different from those of other periods, when natural gas has the highest 
weight in all energy portfolios in this period (Zhang and Chen, 2018). Tsvetanov et al. 
(2016) use the method proposed by Phillips and Yu (2011) and Phillips et al. (2015) to 
test for multiple bubbles in the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) spot and futures oil 
prices. Caspi et al. (2018) use the same method to detect price bubbles in US oil 
prices between 1876 and 2014. Gronwald (2016) reports explosive oil price 
movements around the 2008 global financial crisis. Su et al. (2017) find six bubbles in 
WTI crude oil prices during 1986-2016. Sharma and Escobari (2018) also use 
GSADF method to test the explosive behavior of three energy prices (WTI crude oil, 
heating oil and natural gas) in the US market, but the article only analyze whether 
there are bubbles in energy prices. 
Technically, a bubble means deviation from the fundamental value of the underlying 
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asset (Blanchard and Watson., 1982). It is more likely to happen when the 
fundamental value is not clear to investors. Although the global oil market is liquid 
and large, the fundamentals are not well reflected in oil prices because the 
financialization of oil products has created too much speculation, which dwarfs the 
role of market fundamentals. The globalized market also makes it difficult to measure 
fundamentals worldwide and thus leaves room for speculation. Unlike crude oil, 
which has a global market, natural gas markets are not mature and generally 
segmented and have different fundamental driving factors (Ji et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 
2018a). This combination of indexation to global oil markets and regional differences 
distort signals from gas prices and thus causes speculation and irrational investment. 
Further development of gas pricing mechanisms that can reflect regional gas market 
fundamentals are needed.  
The hypothesis of this paper is that a hub-based pricing system allows natural gas 
prices to reflect the fundamental value of natural gas itself, whereas linking directly to 
crude oil prices in the oil indexation system fails to incorporate gas-specific 
characteristics, and thus leading to potential mispricing. Moreover, GOG competition 
in a hub enables the market to respond quickly to new information, which improves 
the efficiency of the market. In a less efficient market (i.e., oil indexation market), 
natural gas prices are more likely to be affected by speculation or irrational 
investment behavior, which then leads to persistent price deviation from fundamental 
values. In other words, we would expect to see more abnormal price fluctuations with 
oil indexation than in a hub-pricing system. 
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3 Methodology: Testing for multiple bubbles 
The basic method used in this paper is developed by Phillips and Yu (2011) and then 
extended by Phillips et al. (2015) to identify multiple bubbles. Their general idea is to 
use a right-tailed unit-root test (i.e., the augmented Dickey-Fuller test) to detect any 
potential extreme behavior in the series.  
Empirical tests of rational bubbles before the development of Phillips and Yu (2011) 
test often use standard unit-root test based on Campbell and Shiller (1988), which do 
not allow for extreme behavior. A stationary (or cointegrated system in a multivariate 
case) process would indicate that price returns to its fundamental values, whereas a 
nonstationary unit-root result would suggest a persistent price deviation from the 
fundamental value, which indicates the existence of bubbles (e.g. Craine, 1993; Zhang 
et al., 2017a). Phillips and Yu (2011) move one step further from this literature and 
show that asset prices can deviate from fundamental values in a mildly extreme 
manner. They then develop a rolling-windows estimation based on ADF regressions. 
The largest test statistics (the sup) are used as the right-tailed statistic.  
For example, if we let yt be a time-series variable with total observations of T, r1 and 
r2 are the starting position and ending position of the rolling windows, and the size of 
the window is rw = r2 – r1. The typical ADF regression can be written as 
1 2 1 2 1 2, , 1 ,
1
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ
k
i
t r r r r t r r t i t
i
yy c yβ φ ε− −
=
= + + +∆ ∆∑ , (1) 
where c, β, and ϕ are parameters to be estimated, the error term is ɛt ~N(0, ơ2), and k 
is the number of the lags determined by information criteria. The null hypothesis of a 
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standard ADF test is that yt has a unit root against the alternative of β < 0, or it is 
stationary. Phillips and Yu (2011) extend the basic ADF principle to allow for the 
right-sided alternative β > 0 or to consider an extreme alternative hypothesis. 
We normalizing the total observation to 1 and denote rw as the share of data from the 
full sample. The number of observations in each window is therefore Tw = [rwT], and 
[•] represents the integer part of the number in the brackets. If the smallest window 
size is given as r0, then a sequence of test statistics based on the forward expanding 
samples can be derived. A sup of these statistics is defined as sup ADF (SADF) test 
statistics, as follows: 
. (2) 
In reality, there are often multiple bubbles. The SADF test, however, can detect only 
one bubble. To cope with this problem and detect more than one bubble in the series, 
Phillips et al. (2015) develop the generalized sup ADF test (GSADF). A major 
difference here is allowing the starting point in equation (2) to change as well.  
.  (3) 
Phillips et al. (2015) develop the limited distribution of these test statistics and 
provide asymptotic critical values on both the SADF and GSADF statistics. In the 
case of multiple bubbles, the forward expansion method tends to be less powerful in 
identifying more bubbles after the first one. So they propose a date-stamping strategy 
with a double recursive test procedure and backward sup ADF (BSADF) test method, 
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which is based on backward-expanding samples: 
, (4) 
Then the GSADF test can be written as: 
                                (5) 
The sequence of BSADF test statistics will be compared to the critical value of the 
GSADF test. Whenever the statistic exceeds the critical value, there is a bubble, 
which is then considered to burst when the BSADF statistic falls below the critical 
value.  
4 Data 
All data are collected from World Bank commodity price data (the Pink Sheet). They 
are in monthly frequency from January 1982 to October 2017. Oil prices are 
denominated in nominal US dollars per barrel, and natural gas prices are in dollars per 
MMBTU (millions of British thermal units). For oil, we look at WTI and Brent prices, 
whereas for natural gas price, we use the Henry Hub Louisiana spot price for the US, 
LNG import prices (CIF) is used for Japan, and average import border prices and a 
spot price component are used for Europe (in this data, the UK price is excluded 
between June 2000 and March 2010). 
 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
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Figure 1 plots the two monthly prices of oil (Brent and WTI) and three natural gas 
prices separately. Clearly, two oil price series are generally similar, whereas the 
regional natural gas prices have substantial deviations. After 2008, the US Henry Hub 
prices are much lower than the other two prices because of the global financial crisis 
and shale gas revolution (IEA, 2013). Japanese LNG prices increased further to 
around four times the US price after the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in 
2011, which led to greater imports of LNG for power generation. The price 
differences are also reflected in Table 1, which summarizes the descriptive statistics 
for prices as well as the oil-gas price ratios. Among all three gas price series, the 
average value of Japanese LNG prices is the highest and has the highest volatility, 
whereas the US Henry Hub prices have both the lowest average value and standard 
deviation. If we simply consider volatility as a measure of risk in the market, then it is 
obvious that the US market based on GOG pricing has the lowest risk, whereas the 
purely oil-indexed Japanese LNG price has the highest risk. More importantly, the 
simple statistics show that a market with higher risk has to pay higher prices (the 
Asian premium).  
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
To better illustrate the oil-gas price difference, Figure 2 plots the ratio of Brent and 
WTI prices against three natural gas prices. The patterns in these two sets of ratios are 
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essentially identical. In other words, the results should not be sensitive to the choice 
of oil prices. Therefore, we use Brent oil prices in all the following empirical studies. 
It should be noted that 1 barrel of oil is equivalent to 5.55 MMBTU. For the US 
oil-gas price ratio, the graph contains roughly three stages, with an earlier stage of 10: 
1 and then 6: 1 until the 2008 global financial crisis. Because of the significant fall in 
natural gas prices and the recovery in oil prices, oil-gas price ratios have become 
dramatic and extremely volatile. The ratio is much more stable in Europe than in the 
US. In Japan, a clear structural change occurs in the early 2000s, and the ratio 
increases significantly during the 2008 global financial crisis. These clear regional 
differences are consistent with the pricing mechanisms (Zhang and Ji, 2018).  
 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
 
5 Empirical results  
5.1 GSADF bubble test on prices 
Empirical analysis on the multiple bubbles in oil price series has been conducted in 
some recent papers (e.g., Gronwald, 2016; Su et al., 2017; Caspi et al., 2018), 
therefore, this paper will not discuss the bubbles in the oil market in detail and use 
them for reference with respect to natural gas prices. Our results are generally 
consistent with these existing studies (Su et al., 2017) on oil prices, and therefore the 
application on natural gas prices gives comparable results.  
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The GSADF test was performed in Eviews with add-in package "Right Tailed ADF 
Tests" developed by Caspi, I. (2017). The configuration of the GSADF test is standard: 
we use Bayesian information criteria (BIC) to select the optimal number of lags. 
Critical values for the GSADF test are taken from 500 Monte Carlo simulations with 
the actual sample size. 
 
<Insert Figure 3-6 here> 
 
The results are plotted in Figures 3-6 for three natural gas price series and Brent crude 
oil prices.2 In each graph, the price series is plotted (right indexed) on the top. 
Whenever the BSADF test statistics cross a critical value, a bubble forms, and when 
the statistics fall below the critical value, it bursts. Shaded areas in each graph show 
the bubble periods. A summary of all four series is in Table 2. 
 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
Clearly, there are significant differences across these price series. A few observations 
can be summarized as follows: 
1) The US Henry Hub prices have the fewest bubbles, and the timing of these 
                                                        
2 The identified bubbles in Brent crude oil price series are roughly consistent with the results for WTI 
reported in Su et al. (2017). Given that our sample ended in October 2017, which is one year longer 
than in Su et al. (2017), the backward test results differ slightly.  
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explosive dynamics is clearly different from all other series. The 2008 global 
financial crisis has some impact on gas prices in the US, but no unusual 
fluctuation is found during this period.  
2) For European gas prices, Japanese LNG prices, and the Brent oil prices, one or 
two bubbles around 2008 (the global financial crisis period) can be seen clearly. 
The duration of two explosive price movements in European gas prices and Brent 
oil prices are almost identical. Japan has one long bubble that connects the bubble 
periods in the other two markets.  
3) Japanese LNG has the most bubbles. More interestingly, if we exclude the global 
financial crisis period, another unique feature of the Japanese LNG price bubbles 
is their short duration (from one to four months).  
4) Whenever an explosive price movements forms in oil prices, European gas prices 
and Japanese LNG prices both tend to have bubbles. They also show bubbles even 
if the oil market does not.  
Although the method here does not allow us to perform a formal statistical test, this 
information shows some strong and interesting evidence as to whether hub pricing is 
better than oil indexation pricing in the natural gas market.  
Recall that Japan has yet to develop a pricing hub, and its natural gas price closely 
follows oil indexation, whereas the US has a long history of GOG competition in the 
pricing hub. Europe is somewhere in between the other two markets. It features both 
oil indexation in most of the continental natural gas markets and hub pricing hubs in 
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Northwest Europe such as the UK and the Netherlands. These clear differences in 
pricing systems give us a chance to evaluate which one will lead to a better natural 
gas market—and by “better” we mean one likely to keep the market more stable, less 
likely to have speculative price movements (bubbles), and more efficient. To return to 
the earlier evidence from the descriptive statistics, it is obvious that the US hub 
pricing system is associated with the lowest price and the least standard deviation in 
prices. The Japanese LNG price is highest, consistent with the notion of the “Asian 
premium” (Zhang et al., 2018a) and suffers from the highest volatility.  
The results of our bubble tests show more problems in the natural gas prices in Japan. 
With oil indexation, whenever there is an unusual price movement (i.e., a bubble) in 
the international crude oil market, natural gas prices will follow and experience 
explosive price changes. As the pricing system ignores fundamental values in natural 
gas, the market tends to react to information irrationally and thus creates more 
bubbles than are passed from the oil market. The additional bubble pattern becomes 
more obvious with the recent trend in energy financialization. Table 2 shows that, 
since the 2008 global financial crisis, five bubbles emerged in Japanese LNG prices, 
and two bubbles occurred in European prices. Meanwhile, the US Henry Hub prices 
show no explosive bubbles in the same period. Again, no explicit statistical test exists 
to show the causality here, but the historical evidence shows that a hub-pricing system 
is a better choice than oil indexation for maintaining market stability and is more 
efficient in general.  
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5.2 GSADF test on oil-gas price ratios  
Assuming that oil prices contain the fundamental value of natural gas, this subsection 
performs multiple bubble tests on the oil-gas price ratio for the three regional markets. 
The existence of bubbles in the price ratio indicates that oil prices deviate from 
natural gas prices in an extreme way. Figures 7-9 plot the GSADF results on oil-gas 
price ratios in the US, Europe, and Japan.  
 
<Insert Figure 7-9 here>  
 
The results, summarized in Table 3, show cross-market differences. Two explosive 
price movements are found in the US ratio, in 2009 and 2012. In these periods, oil 
prices went up dramatically, whereas natural gas prices in the US remain relatively 
low. The evidence also indicates that US oil and gas prices have largely decoupled 
since the 2008 global financial crisis. Fewer bubbles are found in the ratios in Japan 
and Europe, which is reasonable, especially with oil indexation (Japan and Europe). 
 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
6 Conclusion 
This paper contributes to current debates on international natural gas pricing 
mechanisms with some up-to-date time-series methods. In recent years there have 
been increasing calls for establishing GOG competition pricing hubs in Europe and 
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Asia to cope with higher gas prices (relative to the US) and market volatility. 
Supporting arguments claim that hub pricing can better reflect market fundamentals in 
natural gas and thus create better efficiency. By contrast, the arguments against hub 
pricing and in favor of oil indexation suggest that oil indexation is the best remedy for 
market failure.  
Using the Phillips et al. (2015) multiple bubble detecting technique, we empirically 
study natural gas prices in three major international gas markets. In these markets, the 
US has a long history of having a pure hub pricing system, and Japanese prices are 
mainly indexed to crude oil prices, whereas the European market is a more complex 
mixture of hub pricing and oil indexation. This cross-market difference gives us a 
chance to join the debate between oil indexation and hub pricing. 
Our empirical results show that the oil indexation system (e.g., in Japan) has higher 
prices, higher volatility, and more frequent pricing bubbles. Because of oil indexation, 
natural gas prices will experience explosive price movements whenever a bubble 
forms in crude oil prices. Moreover, unclear information on natural gas fundamental 
values tends to create even more bubbles than in the oil markets. This tendency 
became stronger after the 2008 global financial crisis, when the energy market 
became further financialized (Cheng and Xiong, 2014). The US hub pricing system, 
by better reflecting the fundamental information on natural gas, shows clear 
differences from the international crude oil markets. The Henry Hub price has 
noticeably fewer explosive price movements than the other two prices, which is 
especially noteworthy after the 2008 global financial crisis. Given that the pricing 
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system in Europe is a mixture of the two systems, the number of bubbles there is 
lower than in Japan but more than in the US. More evidence of oil indexation in 
Europe is found. The explosive fluctuations in European average prices largely 
coincide with the bubble periods in Brent crude oil prices.  
Two policy implications emerge from our studies. First, the transition from oil 
indexation to hub pricing should proceed for more efficiency market. Bubbles are 
destructive forces in any market, and neither policy makers nor consumers, in either 
exporting or importing countries, want to experience higher risk. From this point of 
view, our empirical evidence provides clear support for hub pricing and against the 
claim that oil indexation is a better mechanism to avoid market failure. Furthermore, a 
better market should be a more efficient market, in which prices should be able to 
reflect fundamental information accurately and quickly. Without knowing the 
fundamental values of natural gas, it is hard to achieve market efficiency. These 
findings have important real implications to policymakers, especially those in the East 
Asia and Central and East Europe, which are the major battlegrounds between oil 
indexation and hub pricing (EIA, 2017). They should be more determined to transit to 
the hub pricing from indexation and establish functional gas trading hub.  
Second, both importing and exporting countries, which are often assumed to have 
opposite interests, should cooperate in the change in pricing mechanisms during the 
transition. This cooperation is based on the argument that spot prices could be higher 
or lower than oil-indexed prices, and thus hub pricing has a neutral effect for both 
exporters and importers. A real and fresh example is that after being below 
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oil-indexed prices for long time, the Asian spot LNG price in October 2017 nearly 
doubled compared to its low in June 2017 and turned out to be higher than oil-indexed 
prices (Vukmanovic, 2017). Our results further demonstrate that exporters and 
importers have common interests in terms of market efficiency and thus support the 
suggestion in the literature that exporters and importers should work together for the 
transition of pricing mechanisms (e.g., Shi and Variam 2017)).  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
US 3.43  2.64  13.52  1.19  2.10  1.86  7.12  
EUR 5.20  3.76  15.93  1.87  3.23  1.17  3.31  
JPN 6.55  4.89  18.11  2.72  4.07  1.41  3.80  
Brent 42.32  28.38  133.87  9.45  31.63  1.21  3.23  
WTI 41.60  29.56  133.93  11.31  28.36  1.13  3.12  
WTI/US 12.78  11.13  53.06  3.17  6.77  1.96  8.69  
WTI/EUR 7.87  7.80  12.73  2.67  1.55  -0.24  3.74  
WTI/JP 6.20  5.82  11.10  2.82  1.56  0.98  3.78  
Brent/US 12.93  10.72  61.88  2.81  8.07  2.22  9.78  
Brent/JP 6.10  5.65  11.02  2.30  1.63  0.85  3.38  
Brent/EUR 7.75  7.59  12.78  2.59  1.74  -0.01  3.08  
Note: The upper part of this table reports gas (US Henry hub, Europe average and Japan LNG in US 
dollars per MMBTU) and oil prices (Brent and WTI in dollars per barrel), whereas the lower part 
summarizes the information on simple oil/gas price ratios.  
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Table 2. Multiple bubble test results for price series  
  US Henry Hub Europe Japan LNG Oil (Brent) 
  Bubble period Duration (months) Bubble period Duration (months) Bubble period Duration (months) Bubble period Duration (months) 
 03/1986–01/1988 23 01/1987 1 02/1987 1 02/1986–07/1986 6 
 04/1988–06/1988 3 10/1998–07/1999 10 01/1991–02/1991 2 10/2004 1 
 02/1996 1 10/2000–02/2001 5 12/1996–03/1997 4 05/2005–08/2006 16 
 09/2000–03/2001 7 08/2005–12/2006 17 07/2005–01/2009 43 06/2007–08/2008 15 
 09/2005–12/2005 4 10/2007–12/2008 15 07/2011 1 01/2015 1 
   04/2015–10/2016 19 04/2012–05/2012 2 12/1015–02/2016 3 
     04/2015–05/2015 2   
     03/2016–05/2016 3   
Number of bubbles   5(4)   6(5)   8(6)   6(4) 
Average duration  7.6  11.2  7.25  7 
Maximum duration   23   19   43   16 
Note: The number of bubbles in brackets excludes those with only one-month duration.  
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Table 3. Multiple bubble test results for oil/gas price ratios 
  Brent/US Henry Hub   Brent/Europe   Brent/Japan LNG 
  Bubble period Duration (months) Bubble period Duration (months) Bubble period Duration (months) 
 08/2009–09/2009 2 03/1986–07/1986 5 08/2005–10/2005 3 
 01/2012–08/2012 8     
Number of bubbles   2   1   1 
Average duration  5  5  3 
Maximum duration   8   5   3 
33 
 
 
Figure 1. Plots of Crude oil and natural gas prices 
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Figure 2. Oil-gas price ratios 
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Figure 3. Multiple bubble test for the US Henry Hub prices 
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Figure 4. Multiple bubble test for the European average gas prices 
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Figure 5. Multiple bubble test for the Japanese LNG prices 
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Figure 6. Multiple bubbles in Brent oil prices 
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Figure 7. Multiple bubbles in the US oil-gas ratio 
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Figure 8. Multiple bubbles in the Europe oil-gas ratio 
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Figure 9. Multiple bubbles in the Japan oil-gas ratio 
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